Saturday 23 May 2015

The 2000 Liberation: Strategic Consequences




The liberation of year 2000 was a turning point in the history of Lebanon and the region. It is now a school wherefrom any group or people may draw inspiration. Conversely, there has been many a political and media effort to contain this victory, as well as many of the resistance's others, so as to prevent their becoming a factor of prevalent Arab awakening against "Israel". Even so, the major ramifications of Hizbullah's victories in Lebanon up to the 2000 Liberation were reflected in Palestine.

The 2000 Liberation: Strategic Consequences

Although the liberation's effect could have spread wider and could have been more tangible were it not for the counter-war launched by the resistance's enemies in the Arab world. But this war could not shield and prevent a key aspect of the victory's ramifications, namely with regards the balance of the conflict, and political and military thought in the "Israeli" entity.
To talk of the 2000 liberation is to recall all of the resistance's victories and sacrifices, because the liberation was the pinnacle of a series of victories scored by the resistance against all kinds of wars.

Inability to resolve

Resolution is a key element in the "Israeli" Security Strategy, and - according the enemy's army generals and "Israeli" military experts - it means the destruction of the enemy's capabilities and occupation of the land. But Hizbullah's military strategy deprived the enemy its goal. As such, this enabled Hizbullah to join practical initiative with continuity and development.

The Liberation can be approached from two angles:

- The result of "Israeli" inability to resolve the battle with the resistance that managed to preserve its momentum and continue its mounting trajectory, which led to the enemy's attrition and placed pressure upon "Israel", creating a popular and political movement that approves of retreating as a course of action to escape the swamp in which the army is mired.
- On the other hand, the liberation is also an indication of decision makers in "Israel" admitting their inability to resolve. This indicator reveals a drastic change in the "Israeli" political and military creed, and has affected policies and plans to build a different power whose features came to be defined in later years.

The "Israeli" leadership's admitting this impotence pushed it to search for alternative choices and strategies. As a result, the objectives of the wars that Israel has launched since then have receded from resolution to attempting to prevent the resistance's operations to liberate the land.

Inability to deter

Whatever it is that is said of the elements of Hizbullah's power, the most definitive feature of Lebanon is that it possesses inherent weaknesses, such as its limited geography, its small population, and its lack of riches and potential... These are all elements that impact the resistance's capabilities, limits, and its margin of movement. Conversely, the "Israeli" enemy possesses quantitative and qualitative superiority against Lebanon and its resistance on all levels, be they military, security, economic, etc...

This gap between both sides heavily impacted the progression of the conflict, and it would be correct to say that it adds to the glory of Hizbullah's victory, seeing as it took place despite these circumstances and despite the balance of power.

In light of this reality, Hizbullah excelled in forcing new balances primarily based on well thought-out missile retaliations deep inside "Israel".

The most important figure to blatantly admit to this balance was the enemy's current chief of staff, Gadi Eisenkot, when he clarified during a lecture when he was in charge of the northern district "If memory serves, all the missile attacks on "Israeli" towns was in retaliation to "Israeli" army operations that Hizbullah considered to have crosses some line" ["Israeli National Security Research Center"/ Army and Strategy bulletin/ June 2010].
Hizbullah managed to reverse the theory that the enemy had attempted to spread to secure internal consensus in line with the depletion of its ranks. This theory - balance states that "Israel" needs to continue its occupation of Lebanese lands as they constitute a "security belt" to protect the occupied Northern Palestinian territories. But the resistance's missile strategy transformed the occupation into the very reason behind the deterioration of the security of the Northern settlements, and it retaliated to any targeting of Lebanese civil areas.

It turned the Northern settlements into a confine for the movement of occupation forces, who now had to take into account the possibility of their targeting when studying the possibility of expanding the aggression to inside Lebanon. This constructed reality was now an additional pressure factor for the occupation, which increased its losses and its attrition.
Thus, Hizbullah succeeded in confining the area of confrontation away from the Lebanese interior. In other words it greatly succeeded in protecting Lebanese citizens, and one the most important result of this balance was that it actually paved the way for the 2000 liberation.

The enemy's admittance of its failure against the resistance, rather preventing it from pursuing its operation as long as the occupation was to be found on occupied Lebanese lands, led to political and strategic ramifications. This means that "Israel" realized the limits of its power on Lebanon's soil, and that it was incapable of expanding and occupying more Arab land and establishing a foothold there. In other words, the Lebanese resistance shattered the myth of Greater "Israel".

Source: al-Ahed News
23-05-2015 | 12:50

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