Monday 9 May 2011

Palestine-EU relations: "Many regret boycotting Hamas and may be more nuanced now..."

Via FLC

OXAN: Excerpts:

".... with a shifting regional landscape, domestic pressure, and continued deadlock in the peace process with Israel, it shores up the factions where they are vulnerable and, for Hamas, cashes in new political capital... ... The agreement marks a significant turning point. Until elections are held, the West Bank and Gaza governments are likely to coordinate as much as integrate. Successful cohabitation will depend significantly on the attitude of donors to the Palestinian National Authority. Relations with Israel may deteriorate in the short term, but reconfigurations of the local and regional political landscape will in the longer run work against the political deadlock.

Analysis

.... ... The easing of the Gaza blockade following the controversial Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla last May dented already tattered prospects for containing Hamas politically. Meanwhile, the US administration's rollback from an initial commitment to freeze Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank cast into stark relief the limits of its support.

The Arab uprisings and the fall of his staunch ally, Hosni Mubarak, altered PNA President Mahmoud Abbas's calculations. Meanwhile, unrest in Syria threatens one pillar of Hamas's regional support. Encouraged by the success of regional protest movements, Palestinians have also upped pressure for reconciliation.

Each faction, too, had its own vulnerabilities:

1. Fatah: Western donors and Israel have enabled an economic revival in the West Bank -- but Israeli restrictions mean that growth remains heavily driven by donor assistance, has yielded little productive investment ..... Abbas and Fayyad have opted for a unilateral diplomatic strategy, seeking UN recognition of Palestinian statehood. The Palestinian split complicates this strategy. On the other hand, there are doubts within the PNA that Palestinian statehood will actually yield a peace agreement.

2. Hamas: By some tokens, Hamas should be more confident. It has secured its rule in Gaza, witnessed Abbas's diplomatic strategy founder, and watched its parent movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, position itself for a greater role in Egypt. To a degree, reconciliation could be seen as Hamas cashing in early on its improved prospects. Yet it has frustrations of its own:........ Hamas has suffered growing challenges from radical Islamist groups in Gaza, who exert a pull on many rank-and-file members and Despite an easing of the Gaza blockade, and the success of smuggling, which produced 9% growth in Gaza in 2010, 80% of Gazans remain dependent on direct donor assistance...

Reconciliation prospects

... ... Israel and the international community retain the ability to disrupt progress. On May 1, Israel blocked 89 million dollars in tax remittances to the PNA, which account for two-thirds of Fayyad's budget. A similar boycott against the 2006 unity government played a significant role in its fall. However, Western donors may be cautious of undermining Abbas and Fayyad completely... ... European donors will be key; the EU has already pledged 124 million dollars to the PNA following Israel's tax freeze. Many regret boycotting Hamas and may be more nuanced now. They may also be mindful that sanctions could backfire more comprehensively this time, playing into Hamas's hands: while the PNA faces an immediate financial crisis, Gaza is set to benefit from Egyptian pledges to open the Rafah border terminal.

Long-term implications

Reconciliation is fragile, but if it holds, it augurs a political reconfiguration. It is possible that elections will be delayed, or that the factions will fail to open the political playing field. Yet their own positions will have to be staked out more sensitively. Increasingly preoccupied with critics on the Islamic right, Hamas's leadership can now make the case internally for the need to hew closer to majority opinion. Hamas leader-in-exile Khaled Meshal last week called for a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, rather than a long-term ceasefire, marking a rhetorical shift closer to Fatah. There are rumours that Hamas had to give Abbas assurances not only about such rhetoric but also about preventing rocket attacks. If true, this is significant, and may have contributed to the EU aid pledge. Long-term prospects for peace are more open, if also more fraught

Prospects for peace with Israel will not improve in the short term; the stalemate may be complicated by deteriorating PNA-Israeli and PNA-US relations. Yet the longer-term picture is more open, if also more fraught. A viable Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement without Hamas was always going to be difficult. This does not mean external pressure will not be felt or be effective. However, the Palestinian leadership will have not only Hamas, but also domestic and regional regional opinion to point to, thus setting firmer benchmarks for the peace process.

Posted by G, M, Z, or B at 11:46 AM

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